Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Association,
Inc.
878 P.2d 1275 (1994)
Nahrstedt bought a condo in Lakeside Village. It clearly
stated in the homeowners agreement (aka the declaration) that there
was a restriction against keeping pets. Nahrstedt sued to enjoin the
homeowners' restriction.
She wanted to keep Boo-Boo, Dockers, and Tulip.
The Trial Court dismissed Nahrstedt's complaint on a
demurrer. Nahrstedt appealed.
The Appellate Court reversed. Lakeside appealed.
The Appellate Court found that Lakeside could only
enforce the restriction if it could be proven that Nahrstedt's cats would
interfere with the other homeowners' right to the quiet enjoyment of
their property.
The California Supreme Court reversed.
The California Supreme Court found that, under the
California Civil Code (1354), courts are required to enforce
"covenants, conditions, and restrictions" (CC&Rs) contained
in the declaration unless they are unreasonable.
The Court held that unreasonable meant,
"wholly arbitrary, violate in fundamental public policy, or impose
burdens on the use of land that outweighs any benefit."
In addition, reasonable means reasonable to the
entire condominium association, not necessarily reasonable to an
individual owner.
The Court felt that there was a social good in allowing
enforceable CC&Rs.
In addition, unless a blanket rule was promulgated that
it was very difficult to invalidate CC&Rs, then everybody would
start suing, and the burden on both homeowner's associations and the
court system would be unreasonable. Therefore there was a social good
in making the CC&Rs very hard to invalidate.
The Court also pointed out that the Lakeside homeowners
can modify their CC&Rs with a vote. So if Nahrstedt really had a
problem she should take it up at the next homeowners' association
meeting.
The covenant in this case went a little further
than a typical covenant. Here, the covenant created a
"managing board" with the power to adopt and change rules for
the entire community. Here, the covenant is more like a
Constitution; it lays out the basic concepts and creates a governing board
capable of writing, modifying, interpreting, and adjudicating the rules.
Courts have generally found that rules created by
managing boards after people move into a community should be held to a
higher standard of "reasonableness" than rules that were in the
original covenant.
If the "no pets" rule had not been something in
the original declaration, but instead was something that was later
adopted by the managing board, Nahrstedt could have argued that the
should be less enforceable.
Of course, what happens if the "no pets" rule
was not in the original declaration, but had been adopted prior
to Nahrstedt's moving in? Should the rule be held to a higher standard
than if it was in the original declaration, or should it be
considered the same as the original declaration because Nahrstedt
had full knowledge of the rule when she decided to move in?
Typically, courts have said that all rules that passed
after the first person moved in are held to the same standard for
everybody.
If so, then different residents would be held to
different standards based on when then moved in! You'd no longer have
a common interest community.
What if Nahrstedt had been living there, and the
managing board changed the rules? Would Nahrstedt be able to argue reliance
or that the board should be estopped from enforcing the rule
because she's got the equivalent of a non-conforming use?
Conversely, it might be argued that Nahrstedt knew that
joining a common interest community could result in new rules being
created, so she had no reason to assume that there'd never be a no pets
rule.